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RUNNING HEAD: CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION 
  
Conceptual representation is arguably the most important cognitive function in humans.  It stands 
at the centre of the information processing flow, with input from perceptual modules of differing 
kinds, and is centrally involved in memory, speech, planning, decision-making, actions, inductive 
inferences and much more besides.  
 
It is therefore unsurprising that it is also a domain of interest to the full range of cognitive 
sciences – linguistics via lexical semantics, psychology through the use of concepts in thought 
and  categorization and children’s acquisition of concepts and word meanings, AI through the 
development of systems for knowledge representation, neuroscience through the recent 
development of interest in dissociations between knowledge domains and the role of perceptual 
and motor areas in concept representation, and finally philosophy which originally began the 
whole process of trying to find the basic building blocks of thought and knowledge.  In this 
collection, we set our authors the task of attempting to draw together current thinking in their own 
field, and to lay out their views on the importance of their particular approach to concept 
representation.  The result has been a series of papers that by and large have been broader and 
possibly more speculative than would normally appear in a top peer-reviewed journal such as 
Language and Cognitive Processes.  We believe that our authors have responded with 
considerable courage to our call to consider a bigger picture, and we are delighted with the 
resulting articles. 
 
In this introductory piece we aim to set the scene for the papers that appear later.  It is necessarily 
a rather artificial task to take our eight papers and to cast them into a single framework.  
However, we were struck by the number of common issues and links that we found. 
 
A major theme that emerges from the papers in this collection is the issue of the relation of 
thought to language – or concepts to meanings.  Wisniewski, Lamb and Middleton present a 
review of a large number of studies investigating what initially appears to be a purely linguistic 
phenomenon – the distinction in many languages between count nouns such as bicycle and mass 
nouns such as spinach.  The former can be counted (two bicycles), whereas the latter are modified 
by quantifiers suggesting they are undifferentiated masses (a lot of spinach).  It has been argued 
that the distinction is largely a matter of convention, varying from language to language in an 
unpredictable way.  For example, in English, rain is a mass noun but shower a count noun, rice a 
mass noun but lentil a count noun.   In reviewing their evidence, Wisniewski et al. reveal some of 
the many subtle cognitive dimensions underlying the syntactic distinction.  There are, to be sure, 
some specifically linguistic effects, often dependent on historical change.  However, they show in 
a series of experiments that, for example, people typically interact with the referents of mass (e.g. 
furniture) as opposed to count (e.g. vehicle) superordinate nouns in different ways, and that they 
consider object parts to be more important properties of count superordinates than of mass 
superordinates.  Consequently Wisniewski et al. suggest that people conceptualise the two forms 
of superordinate concepts in different ways. 
 
The syntactic forms of a language, then, can be shown to bear strong relations to conceptual 
distinctions in thought.   The reverse conclusion is proposed by Levy in his review of 
Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument (PLA), and its implications for the philosophy and 
psychology of concepts.  In an argument that is reminiscent of both functionalism and social 
constructionism, the PLA purports to show that the determination of the content of a person’s 
internal representation of a concept is itself dependent on a publicly shared language.  Levy 
presents different possible views of how we might have concepts that enable us to think the same 
thoughts as others – something which seems a desirable property for any theory of concepts.  He 
describes Peacocke’s theory of concept possession in which the individuation of concepts is 
achieved by determining the set of predispositions and abilities that a person must show in order 
for them to be deemed to possess the concept (Peacocke, 1992).  To possess the concept of 
bicycle is to be able to do a number of things – for example, recognise one, know what it is for, 
how it works. Levy then provides an account of Fodor’s theory of concepts as atomic symbols 
representing external properties (Fodor, 1988, 2000).  He argues that both of these influential 
theories of concepts fail fully to account for the problems raised in Wittgenstein’s PLA.  He 
concludes by tentatively endorsing Dummett’s Priority thesis that the “order of explanation” must 
take language first and concepts second.  It follows that it will not be possible to provide an 
account of, say, concept acquisition, without first providing an account of language acquisition 
(Dummett, 1991).  It is only through study of the usage of terms in a public language that we can 
have an independent way of fixing the contents of people’s concepts.  
 
The way in which concepts and word meanings are acquired is the key question in the paper by 
Diesendruck.  He reviews a range of literature on the way in which children learn to label, 
categorize and reason about the world.  From his review he draws the conclusion that there may 
be strong domain differences in the way that one might apply a principle like the Language 
Priority thesis.  He finds that whereas artefact kinds such as tools, furniture and vehicles are 
highly susceptible to linguistic and cultural factors in learning, natural kinds like animals are 
relatively immune to such effects.  Diesendruck notes that this evidence is consistent with a 
modular account of domain-specific learning, in which a naïve essentialism is applied very early 
on to the acquisition of categories of animals.  Children understand very quickly that animal kinds 
are based on deep causal principles and not on superficial appearance.  Interestingly, the 
categorization of people appears to fall somewhere between animals and artefacts in the scale of 
essentialist thinking. 
 
The issue of differences in representation and processing across conceptual domains is clearly 
one that arises in a number of the contributions to this volume (see for example the cognitive 
neuropsychological papers described later).  Sloman and Malt provide a challenging paper in 
which they argue that artefacts should not be considered as “kinds” in the way that natural kinds 
are.  They consider (among other positions) arguments for the categorization of artefact kinds 
being based on a belief in a common essence – such as the function that the object was intended 
to have when it was created.  They claim that the only non-circular way to test such a notion is in 
relation to the linguistically determined name categories – the classes of objects that get called by 
the same name.  But the cross-linguistic diversity and the context-dependent nature of naming is 
not consistent with any direct or stable relation between classes defined by intended function and 
those defined by naming data.   They draw the conclusion that artefacts do not come grouped into 
stable kinds.  Their paper therefore sits well alongside Levy’s in the sense that both raise 
important issues about the relation between concepts and language.  Levy questions the feasibility 
of determining conceptual content in the absence of a prior analysis of language use, whereas 
Sloman and Malt argue that in the case of artefacts different tasks (of which naming is one) will 
lead to different ways of creating conceptual groupings. 
 
Keil’s paper is concerned with an important aspect of conceptual thinking – the role of causal 
notions in the contents of our concepts.  It has become a commonplace criticism of the simple 
similarity-based views of concept structure proposed by prototype or exemplar theories that our 
concepts play a crucial role in our theoretical understanding and explanation of the world and 
how it works.  This “theory theory” was introduced in a seminal paper by Murphy and Medin 
(1985), and has had a particularly strong following among developmentalists.  Demonstrations of 
causal theory effects in young children have ironically sometimes given the impression that 
young children have far more sophisticated concepts than do adults.  Keil starts to unravel this 
puzzle, and to flesh out the often vague proposals of the theory theory.  He presents a set of 
experiments introducing the Illusion of Explanatory Depth (IOED), in which he shows that 
people confidently believe they know how things work, but when challenged are forced to 
acknowledge that their understanding is superficial and even incoherent.  Our concepts cannot 
therefore be like the concepts in scientific theories in which the definition and role of the concepts 
is clearly specified in axiomatic fashion.   Keil suggests that what remains of the theory theory 
notion is that we have deep knowledge of a higher but coarser level of causal information.  For 
example, children quite quickly develop an understanding of what dimensions of a domain are 
likely to prove important for classification.  They learn, for example, that colour is important in 
differentiating plants, but not in differentiating cars.  They also develop a sophisticated 
understanding of the way in which human knowledge is divided up into domains of expertise.  
Knowing whom to ask if you have a desire to know more about a concept is a key part of the 
representation of the conceptual domain itself.   Once again, domains of knowledge are a central 
theme here, as different dimensions and different forms of expertise are relevant in each domain. 
 
Several of the papers in this volume address the issue of the relationship between conceptual 
representations and sensory-motor systems. Concepts allow us to access knowledge about the 
physical attributes of objects in the world, including colour, shape, motion, sound and texture as 
well as the actions we associate with them. Nevertheless, there is a traditional view in the fields 
of cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, that conceptual representations are different in 
kind from those computed within the perceptual input systems and motor output systems that feed 
into and out of them; that concepts are amodal symbolic representations, abstracted from their 
modality-specific perceptual bases.  This position is challenged by Barsalou who develops the 
thesis that there is a common representational format for conceptual and sensory-motor 
processing, as part of his situated simulation account.   He argues that situated simulation is 
dynamic, context-dependent and goal-driven. Barsalou marshals an impressive array of data from 
behavioural experiments, lesion studies and functional neuro-imaging studies in support of his 
claim that perceptual simulations represent concepts. Barsalou and colleagues have also 
conducted several studies using property generation and verification paradigms, which suggest an 
ubiquitous role for perceptual variables (such as property shape and size) in conceptual 
processing. In one study, for example, they found that subjects were slower to verify the 
properties of objects that would normally be occluded from view (e.g. the roots of a lawn), but 
that this was not the case if the concept was presented in a linguistic context that revealed those 
properties (e.g. rolled-up lawn).  
 
Barsalou also interprets evidence from functional neuro-imaging studies of conceptual processing 
within the situated simulation framework. Many studies have found that areas of the brain 
adjacent to specific sensory-motor systems are differentially activated as a function of the 
conceptual category or type of property being processed; for example, visual areas are relatively 
more activated when people process objects for which the visual modality is important (e.g. 
animals), while certain motor areas are activated when people process motor-related objects such 
as tools. As Barsalou points out, the areas activated are not necessarily the primary sensory-motor 
areas that are involved in perception and action themselves, but rather adjacent areas, which 
leaves open a number of interpretations. Some studies have also interpreted domain effects in 
terms of the nature of conceptual processing required rather than the sensory-motor contents of 
the representations per se (e.g. Tyler & Moss, 2001). 
 
Studies of neuropsychological patients with impairments to the conceptual system provide further 
insights into the format and organisation of conceptual knowledge and its relation to sensory-
motor systems. Barsalou suggests an integrative framework that reconciles apparently conflicting 
hypotheses about category and modality specific conceptual deficits. Essentially he suggests a 
series of convergence zones (c.f. Damasio & Damasio, 1994) which integrate increasingly widely 
distributed modality-specific representations located within the sensory-motor systems of the 
brain. The importance of neuropsychological data in theoretical development of these issues is 
reflected in the final two papers in this volume; Rogers, Hodges, Lambon Ralph & Patterson 
and Saffran, Coslett, Martin & Boronat. These two papers also address the issue of the relation 
between conceptual knowledge and sensory systems, and echo many of the points raised by 
Barsalou.  First, Saffran et al put forward a view that has become quite widely accepted in the 
neuropsychological literature; that conceptual knowledge is distributed across a network of 
modality-specific attribute systems determined by the mode of input of acquisition. For example, 
there are held to be visual, auditory, verbal and kinaesthetic systems. This proposal has several 
elements in common with Barsalou’s account, although it is framed within a more traditional 
semantic memory system, in which the attribute systems may be seen as amodal redescriptions of 
sensory-motor properties. Nevertheless, different parts of the conceptual representation are 
claimed to be preferentially accessed by different input modalities, and crucially the attribute 
systems are held to be localised in different regions of the brain and so may be selectively 
impaired by brain damage.  
 
In support of their theoretical claims Saffran et al present data from a patient, BA who has a 
progressive disorder of conceptual knowledge, with a significantly greater difficulty accessing 
conceptual information from words than from pictures.  The interpretation of BA’s deficit 
highlights one way that Saffran et al’s position diverges from that of Barsalou. Saffran et al 
propose that BA’s impairment on semantic tasks with words is attributable to selective damage to 
a propositional/encyclopaedic attribute sub-system; words are held to initially access this type of 
conceptual knowledge (since they were the mode of input responsible for its acquisition), whereas 
pictures primarily access the visual store.  Barsalou’s situated simulation account does not 
incorporate the idea that verbal inputs preferentially access a propositional semantic system, since 
words are claimed to involve sensory-motor simulations in just the same way as pictures. Indeed, 
there would be no separate propositional sub-system.  
 
The nature of the conceptual/perceptual interface is also the central issue addressed by Rogers et 
al.  In a similar vein to Barsalou, Rogers et al distinguish between two broad views of the 
conceptual/perceptual relationship. One is a multi-modal distributed network, in which  
conceptual representations emerge from the associations among the representations that subserve 
perception, recognition and action across different modalities.  This is contrasted with the 
“traditional” view, in which there is a central conceptual system, separate to “pre-semantic” 
modality-specific input systems, such as structural descriptions for object recognition, or lexical 
representations in the language system. In their exposition, Rogers et al refer to the former 
approach as a process-based account of conceptual information – semantic memory serves the 
function of associating sets of modality specific representations, while the latter account is 
described as a content-based approach, in that semantic memory is defined as having content or 
meaning, while non-semantic representations such as structural descriptions (i.e. stored 
representations of object shapes) do not. The content-based view of the conceptual system has 
been supported by reports of neuropsychological patients with apparent dissociations between 
impaired semantic memory and intact structural descriptions, as revealed in tasks such as object 
decision – where patients are asked to distinguish between line drawings of real versus chimeric 
objects or creatures. This has been interpreted as evidence for the functional (and perhaps neural) 
separation of conceptual and perceptual representations. Rogers et al present data from a set of 
novel object decision tasks, challenging this apparent dissociation. When materials are 
appropriately controlled for object typicality, patients with semantic deficits do show problems in 
object decision; they tend to accept as real those chimeric objects which have features typical of 
members of the category, and reject real objects with atypical features (e.g. they may reject a 
drawing of a camel as being a non-object, because it has an atypical feature - a hump-, but accept 
a chimeric picture of a camel with its hump removed, since this produces a more typical animal 
shape). 
 
Thus there is considerable common ground across this group of three papers concerning the 
interface between conceptual and sensory-motor systems. All three challenge the view that there 
is a single static system of amodal conceptual representations. All three propose the distribution 
of conceptual knowledge across multiple sets of modality-specific attributes, which may be 
neurally as well as functionally distinct. And all three seem to share the assumption that concepts 
emerge from the interactive activation or simultaneous simulation of multiple modalities of 
information, perhaps implemented in terms of cross-modal convergence zones. As reviewed in 
each of these papers, many sources of psychological, neuropsychological and neuro-imaging data 
are consistent with these general claims.  
 
However, there remain critical differences between the approaches taken in the three papers. For 
example, although Saffran et al and Rogers et al both claim that conceptual knowledge is 
distributed over multiple modality-specific attributes, rather than residing in a central amodal 
semantic system, they differ in the nature of the proposed relation between structural and 
semantic systems. Saffran et al’s framework suggests a number of semantic subsystems, each 
storing semantic properties relevant to a specific modality (visual semantics, tactile semantics 
etc), with a separate level of pre-semantic perceptual systems corresponding to each modality 
(e.g. structural descriptions for visual objects).  For Rogers et al, there is no such distinction 
between a semantic and structural level of representation; rather there is a unitary semantic 
system - better described as a process or function than a level of representation -  which consists 
of the associations among the modality-specific structural or perceptual representations. 
Moreover, the Saffran et al framework is consistent with the view that the sensory-motor 
properties within each semantic subsystem are represented as amodal symbolic redescriptions, 
distinct from the modality-specific representational format of the input/output systems to which 
they are linked. In this respect it is very different to Barsalou’s situated simulation model.  
 
In summary, the eight papers in this volume address many central issues in the study of 
conceptual representations. We hope that the juxtaposition of these papers in the current volume - 
tackling related questions but from very different perspectives - will prompt debate as to whether 
it is the similarities or the differences among the approaches that are the more significant. 
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